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Abstract
Dynamic discrete choice models are used to estimate the intertemporal preferences of an
agent as described by a reward function based upon observable histories of states and imple-
mented actions. However, in many applications, such as reliability and healthcare, the system
state is partially observable or hidden (e.g., the level of deterioration of an engine, the condi-
tion of a disease), and the decision maker only has access to information imperfectly correlated
with the true value of the hidden state. In this paper, we consider the estimation of a dynamic
discrete choice model with state variables and system dynamics that are hidden (or partially
observed) to both the agent and the modeler, thus generalizing Rust’s [26] model to partially
observable cases. We analyze the structural properties of the model and prove that this model
is still identifiable if the cardinality of the state space, the discount factor, the distribution of
random shocks, and the rewards for a given (reference) action are given. We analyze both
theoretically and numerically the potential mis-specification errors that may be incurred when
Rust’s model is improperly used in partially observable settings. We further apply the devel-
oped model to a subset of Rust’s [26] dataset for bus engine mileage and replacement decisions.
The results show that our model can improve model fit as measured by the log-likelihood func-
tion by 17.7% and the log-likelihood ratio test shows that our model statistically outperforms
Rust’s model. Interestingly, our hidden state model also reveals an economically meaningful
route assignment behavior in the dataset which was hitherto ignored, i.e. routes with lower
mileage are assigned to buses believed to be in worse condition.
1 Introduction
We consider the task of training a model of dynamic decisions by a single human agent based
upon the history of implemented actions with hidden (or partially observable) states and sys-
tem dynamics. Under the assumption of complete state observability, this problem has been
widely studied in two strands in the literature where it is referred to as inverse reinforcement
learning (IRL) or alternatively as structural estimation.
The bus engine replacement model developed in Rust’s seminal paper [26] has served as a
point of reference for this literature over decades. The model assumes that at each time period
and for every bus in the fleet, Mr. Zurcher (a superintendent of maintenance of city of Madi-
son’s Metropolitan Bus Company) had to choose between replacing the engine or continuing
to operate at a cost which included maintenance and loss of ridership in the case of a break-
down. The model assumes the accumulated mileage is a sufficient statistic for determining the
on-going cost of operation for a given bus at any time period. To capture other unobservables
likely affecting Mr. Zurcher’s decisions, the model features random cost perturbations which
are privately observed by Mr. Zurcher. Hence, Mr. Zurcher’s decisions are modeled as result-
ing from a Markov Decision Process (MDP) subject to independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) cost perturbations.
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Assuming cumulative mileage as a sufficient statistic for making replacement decisions
goes counter to much of the reliability literature on models of cumulative damage (see e.g.
[29]). Cumulative mileage and other specialized tests only provide informative signals of the
true underlying engine state.1 In addition, while some extensions of the Rust’s model have
considered serial correlation in cost perturbations (see e.g. [25]), serial correlation may in fact
be an endogenous feature of the dynamic decision making process: for example, in order to
minimize maintenance costs, Mr. Zurcher could have conceivably assigned higher mileage
routes to buses with engines he believed were in a better condition.
Rather than modeling Mr. Zurcher’s decisions as resulting from a MDP with (possibly
serially correlated) cost perturbations, it seems more appropriate to model such decisions as
consistent with an evolving belief on the level of unobservable damage or deterioration of the
engine. In this paper, we develop a dynamic discrete choice model of an agent’s decisions as
resulting from a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). At each stage, the
agent (e.g., Mr. Zurcher) collects observations (e.g., mileage) that are imperfectly correlated
with the state and makes decisions based on the entire history of his/her observations and ac-
tions. As in the original Rust’s model, we assume that not all these observations are available
to the modeler. For a given set of publicly revealed observations and action sequences, our
objective is to develop a new estimation method for determining maximum likelihood esti-
mates of the primitive parameters of the underlying controlled stochastic process, including
the agent’s reward structure and the system hidden dynamics. We show that the belief of the
unobserved system state is a sufficient statistic for the proposed hidden state dynamic discrete
choice model. Numerical testings on both synthetic datasets and on the Rust dataset demon-
strate that our model significantly outperforms the (completely observable) Rust’s model as it
identifies features which the Rust’s model was unable to detect.
Making dynamic decisions when the relevant state variable is only partially observable is a
general trait in many application domains. For example, in healthcare settings, the true phys-
iological state of a patient, especially for cancers and chronic diseases [31], is only imperfectly
known even with the most advanced testing technologies. In these cases, it is not reasonable to
use a model relying on the assumption of the state being observable as it may inevitably incur
model mis-specification errors. It is well known that model mis-specification errors will not di-
minish as sample size increases, and more importantly, model estimation can lead to erroneous
and/or misleading results.
Unfortunately, this fundamental issue has not been examined in literature. The economet-
rics research has been focused on (i) developing efficient algorithms to address computational
challenges in estimating the structural parameters such as determining the value function used
in the likelihood function estimation [17], [18], [2], [3], [32], [20]; (ii) relaxing restrictive as-
sumptions on the unobservables to the modeler such as considering permanent heterogeneity
[5], [4], serially correlated unobservables [6], [25], unobservables correlated across choices [21],
[11], etc.; (iii) analyzing approximation errors, inference and validation [16], [19]; (iv) examin-
ing nonparametric and semiparametric identification issues and estimation [1], [22]. Dynamic
discrete choice estimation methods have been widely used in applications including retirement
behaviors [28], occupational choices and career decisions of young men [13], incentives to get
teachers to work [12], adult women’s mammography decisions [14], trade and labor markets
[8], car ownership [10], etc. We remark that the ”unobservables” mentioned in the literature
specifically refers to state components that are not observed by the modeler (but they are com-
pletely observable to the agent). On the contrary, the “hidden state” in this paper refers to the
situations where the system state is not observable to both the agent and the modeler.
A maximum entropy method proposed in [36] has been highly influential in the computer
science literature. This method can be seen as an information theoretic derivation of the Rust’s
nested loop estimation [26]. Sample-based algorithms for implementing the maximum entropy
method have scaled to scenarios with nonlinear reward functions (see e.g., [7],[15]). In [9], the
1Identifying a set of performance indicators closely related to the engine degradation state is a critical issue in
predictive maintenance literature [30].
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authors extended the maximum entropy estimation method to a partially observable environ-
ment, assuming both the transition probabilities and observation probabilities are known with
domain knowledge. These methods have also been used for apprenticeship learning where
a robot learns from expert-based demonstrations [36]. To our best knowledge, none of these
existing works have developed a general methodology to jointly estimate the reward structure
and system dynamics based on trajectories of a POMDP.
We now summarize the main contributions of this paper. First, we develop a new dynamic
discrete choice model which generalizes the Rust’s model [26] by taking into consideration
that both the system state and the system dynamics may be hidden. Secondly, although the
system state and dynamics are not directly observable from a dataset like in the Rust’s model,
we prove that the model is still identifiable if the cardinality of the system state space, the
distribution of random shocks, the discount factor, and the reward structure in a reference
action are known. Thirdly, when the dimensions of the possible system states and observations
are the same, we characterize the deviation between the estimated quantities from the Rust’s
model and the quantities that the modeler intends to measure. This deviation is induced by
using a mis-specified model, namely, applying a model for completely observable cases to
situations where the system state and dynamics are hidden. The potential discrepancies are
further illustrated via numerical examples. Lastly, we apply the model to the widely studied
Rust’s engine replacement dataset. We show that our new estimation method can dramatically
improve the data fit by 17.7% in terms of the log-likelihood. The log-likelihood ratio test also
suggests that our approach performs significantly better than the Rust’s model. Furthermore,
the results from our model indicate that Mr. Zurcher was trying to optimize route assignments
based on engine conditions. This is a feature of Mr. Zurcher’s decisions that has been hitherto
ignored.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the classical dynamic
discrete choice model with observable states, which we will compare with and generalize. Sec-
tion 3 presents our dynamic discrete choice model for partially observable states and hidden
dynamics with model formulation in Section 3.1 and structural results in Section 3.2. The iden-
tification results are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we present the deviation between the
quantities that the modeler intends to analyze from what he/she may get when the modeler
applies the Rust’s model to situations where the system state and dynamics are hidden. This
deviation represents the so called “specification error” in statistical analysis when the selected
model poorly represents the underlying data generation process. The numerical evaluation in
Section 6 tests and validates our hidden state model from two perspectives. Section 6.1 ap-
plies our hidden state model to the bus engine replacement data in [26], and compares to the
results from the Rust’s model. In Section 6.2, we perform the model validation using synthetic
datasets generated by predefined models. Section 7 summarizes research results and discusses
future research directions.
2 Dynamic Discrete Choice Estimation with Observable States
We now briefly review the problem of constructing a model of dynamic decision making by a
single human agent based upon the history of implemented actions and states with observable
state in [27].
At time t ≥ 0, the human agent implements an action at from the action space A and
receives a reward rθ1(st, at) + et(at), where st is the system state at time t from the state space
S, rθ1(st, at) is the parametrized reward associated to the state-action pair (st, at), θ1 ∈ Rp1 for
some p1 ∈ N+, and et(at) is a random perturbation. The cardinality of A is finite, |A| < ∞.
Upon implementing the action at ∈ A, the system state evolves according to a Markov
process with parametrized conditional probabilities Pθ2(st+1, et+1|st, et, at) where θ2 ∈ Rp2 for
some p2 ∈ N+. The conditional independence assumption in [27] assumes:
P(st+1, et+1|st, et, at) = P(et+1|st+1)P(st+1|st, at).
In addition, the reward perturbation vectors {et ∈ R|A|, t > 0} are assumed to be indepen-
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dently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time with probability measure µ. Thus, the
decision process of the agent can be modelled as
Vθ(st, et) = max
at∈A
[rθ1(st, at) + et(at) + β ∑
st+1∈S
∫
Vθ(st+1, et+1)Pθ2(st+1|st, at)dµ(et+1|st+1)], (1)
where θ = (θ1, θ2), and β ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor. The above equation can be rewritten as
Vθ(st, et) = max
at∈A
[rθ1(st, at) + et(at) + β ∑
st+1∈S
V¯θ(st+1)Pθ2(st+1|st, at)] (2)
where V¯θ(st+1) =
∫
Vθ(st+1, et+1)dµ(et+1|st+1).
A (Markovian) model of the human agent’s decisions is a function piθ(a|s) (belonging to
a dimension |A| − 1 simplex), which gives the probability that the human agent implements
action a when the state is s. This function is also referred to as the conditional choice probability
(CCP) function in the literature. When the distribution of the random perturbations {et(a), t ≥
0} are i.i.d. standard Gumbel for all a ∈ A, the CCP’s are of the form:
piθ(a|s) = exp Qθ(s, a)∑a′∈A exp Qθ(s, a′)
(3)
where
Qθ(s, a) = rθ1(s, a) + β ∑
s′∈S
V¯θ(s′)Pθ2(s
′|s, a) (4)
V¯θ(s) = γ+ log ∑
a∈A
exp(Qθ(s, a)), (5)
and γ > 0 is the Euler’s constant. For data in the form of a collection of N > 0 independent
finite sequences of state-action pairs {(st,i, at,i), 0 ≤ t ≤ T}Ni=1, a likelihood function is defined
as:
log `(θ) , log
N
∏
i=0
T
∏
t=0
piθ(at,i|st,i)Pθ2(st+1,i|st,i, at,i)
=
N
∑
i=1
(
T
∑
t=0
logpiθ(at,i|st,i) +
T−1
∑
t=0
log Pθ2(st+1,i|st,i, at,i)
)
(6)
A model of the agent can be obtained by finding the parameter θ∗ ∈ Rp1 ×Rp2 that maxi-
mizes the log likelihood in (6).
3 Dynamic Discrete Choice for Hidden States and Dynamics
This section generalizes the Rust’s framework in [27] for the completely observable case to the
partially observable case.
3.1 Model Formulation
At each decision epoch t ≥ 0, the value of state st is not directly observable to the human
agent nor to the external modeler. Both the human agent and the external modeler are able
to receive the value of a public random variable zt ∈ Z correlated with the underlying state st,
assuming the cardinality of the observation space Z is finite. As in the Rust’s model, we assume
the human agent observes a private signal (or reward perturbation) et(at) when implementing
action at ∈ A. If the hidden state is st, the reward accrued is rθ1(st, at) + et(at) where θ1 ∈ Rp1
for some p1 ∈ N+. The system dynamics is described by probabilities Pθ2(zt+1, et+1, st+1|st, at)
where θ2 ∈ Rp2 for some p2 ∈N+; see Figure 1 for a schematic representation.
Let ζt = {zt, ..., z1, at−1, ..., a0, x0} be the publicly received history of the dynamic decision
process including all past and present revealed observations and all past actions at time t > 0,
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Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the proposed dynamic discrete choice model with par-
tially observable states and hidden dynamics. At each stage, zt is observed by both the
human agent and the modeler, and et is privately observed by the human agent.
where x0 = {P(s0), s0 ∈ S} is the prior belief vector over S, assuming |S| < ∞. Similar to [27],
we assume
Additively Separable (AS) Rewards:
∑
st
P(st|ζt, et)rθ1(st, at) =∑
st
P(st|ζt)rθ1(st, at) + et(at); (7)
Conditional Independence (CI) Assumption:
Pθ2(zt+1, et+1|ζt, et, at) = P(et+1|zt+1)Pθ2(zt+1|ζt, at). (8)
Note that different from the CI Assumption in [26], {ζt, et} is not Markovian. However, zt+1 is
a sufficient statistic for et+1, indicating et and et+1 are independent given zt+1 and
Pθ2(zt+1, et+1, st+1|st, at) = P(et+1|zt+1)Pθ2(zt+1, st+1|st, at). (9)
In addition, the conditional probability P(zt+1|ζt, at) does not depend on et.
Under Assumptions AS and CI, the decision making process of the agent can be modelled as
Vt,θ(ζt, et) = max
at∈A
{
∑
st
P(st|ζt)rθ1(st, at) + et(at)
+ β ∑
zt+1
∫
Pθ2(zt+1|ζt, at)Vt+1,θ(ζt+1, et+1)dµ(et+1|zt+1)
}
, (10)
which can be viewed as a POMDP with perturbations {et : t ≥ 0} and {P(st|ζt) : t ≥ 0} is
commonly called the belief over system state st, given the history at stage t. We thus explain
the random shock as follows. If the modeler knew the values of (ζt, et), then the modeler could
also replicate the solution of the POMDP in (10). Because of this noise, the modeler does not
know exactly the true value of belief {P(st|ζt, et)}, resulting in a perturbation to the one-step
reward.
The objective of the modeler is to identify θ1 in the reward structure rθ1(st, at), and θ2 in the
dynamics Pθ2(zt+1, st+1|st, at) from the publicly received histories {ζ iT}Ni=1. Consequently, the
underlying hidden state transition probabilities can be determined by
Pθ2(st+1|st, at) = ∑
zt+1
Pθ2(zt+1, st+1|st, at), (11)
and the observation probabilities Pθ2(zt+1|st+1, st, at) can also be obtained from
Pθ2(zt+1|st+1, st, at) =
Pθ2(zt+1, st+1|st, at)
∑zt+1 Pθ2(zt+1, st+1|st, at)
, (12)
assuming ∑zt+1 Pθ2(zt+1, st+1|st, at) > 0.
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3.2 Structural Results
The main challenge of Eq. (10) is that the cardinality of ζt grows to infinity as t increases. We
now present a computationally attractive form of ζt for Eq. (10) and correspondingly, a new
estimation method for the partially observable case.
Denote P(z, a) = {Ps,s′(z, a)}, where [34]
Ps,s′(z, a) = P(zt+1 = z, st+1 = s
′|st = s, at = a). (13)
Let xt = {xt(s) : s ∈ S}, where xt(s) = P(st = s|ζt) and x0 = {P(s0) : s0 ∈ S} is given.
Then ∀t, xt ∈ X = {x ∈ R|S| : x(s) ≥ 0, s ∈ S,∑s∈S x(s) = 1}, and since |S| < ∞, xt is finite
dimensional. By the Bayes’ rule, [34] shows {xt, t = 0, 1, ...} is a controlled Markov process
since there is a function λ(zt+1, xt, at) such that
xt+1 = λ(zt+1, xt, at) =
xtP(zt+1, at)
σ(zt+1, xt, at)
, (σ(zt+1, xt, at) 6= 0) (14)
σ(zt+1, xt, at) = P(zt+1|ζt, at) = xtP(zt+1, at)1, (15)
where
[xtP(zt+1, at)]s′ =∑
s
xt(s)Ps,s′(zt+1, at),
xtP(zt+1, at)1 =∑
s′
∑
s
xt(s)Ps,s′(zt+1, at).
Define r(xt, at) = ∑st xt(st)r(st, at). The next theorem leverages results in the POMDP litera-
ture and shows that the belief process {xt, t ≥ 0} is a sufficient statistic for our hidden state
dynamic discrete choice model.
Theorem 1. xt(st) = P(st|ζt) is a sufficient statistic to Eq. (10), and thus
Vt,θ(ζt, et) = Vt,θ(xt, et)
= max
at∈A
{
rθ1(xt, at) + et(at) + β ∑
zt+1
∫
σθ2(zt+1, xt, at)Vt+1,θ(λ(zt+1, xt, at), et+1)dµ(et+1|zt+1)
}
.
(16)
Define
Qt(xt, at) = r(xt, at) + β ∑
zt+1
∫
σ(zt+1, xt, at)Vt+1(λ(zt+1, xt, at), et+1)dµ(et+1|zt+1). (17)
Then,
Vt(xt, et) = max
at∈A
{Qt(xt, at) + et(at)} . (18)
We extend the concept of social surplus function in [23] and [27] by
G[{u(xt, at), at ∈ A}|xt, zt] =
∫
max
at∈A
[u(xt, at) + et(at)]dµ(et|zt), (19)
for a measurable function u : X × A → R. Then by the dominated convergence theorem and
probability theory, we have (analogous to Theorem 3.1 in [27])
Theorem 2. If µ(det|zt) has finite first moments, then the social surplus function (19) exists and it is
G[{u(xt, at), at ∈ A}|xt, zt] = ∑
at∈A
pi(at|xt)(u(xt, at) + E[et|Y(u, e) = at, zt]), (20)
where Y(u, e) = arg maxat∈A(u(xt, at) + et(at)). Furthermore,
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(i) G is a convex function of {u(x, a), a ∈ A};
(ii) G satisfies the additivity property, i.e., for any α ∈ R,
G[{u(xt, at) + α, at ∈ A}|xt, zt] = α+ G[{u(xt, at), at ∈ A}|xt, zt]; (21)
(iii) The partial derivative of G with respect to u(xt, at) is the conditional choice probability:
∂G[{u(xt, at), at ∈ A}|xt, zt]
∂u(xt, at)
= pi(at|xt). (22)
LetB be the Banach space of bounded, Borel measurable functions H : X × A → R under the
supremum norm. Define an operator H : B → B by
[Hv](x, a) = r(x, a) + β∑
z′
σ(z′, x, a)G[{v(λ(z′, x, a), a′), a′ ∈ A}|λ(z′, x, a), z′]. (23)
Assume the following regularity conditions (similar to [27] with state replaced by belief x):
(i) (Bounded Upper Semicontinuous) For each a ∈ A, r(x, a) is upper semicontinuous in
belief x with bounded expectation and
h(x) :=
∞
∑
t=1
βtht(x) < ∞,
h1(x) = max
a∈A ∑z′∈Z
σ(z′, x, a)
∫
max
a′∈A
|r(λ(z′, x, a), a′) + e′(a′)|dµ(e′|z′),
ht(x) = max
a∈A ∑z′∈Z
σ(z′, x, a)ht−1(λ(z′, x, a));
(ii) (Weakly Continuous) The stochastic kernel σ(·., x, a) = {σ(z, x, a)}z∈|Z| is weakly contin-
uous in X× A;
(iii) (Bounded Expectation) The reward r ∈ B and for each v ∈ B, Ev ∈ B, where
[Ev](x, a) = ∑
z′∈Z
σ(z′, x, a)G[{v(λ(z′, x, a), a′), a′ ∈ A}|λ(z′, x, a), z′].
Theorem 3. Under AS, CI, and the regularity conditions, H : B → B is a contraction mapping with
modulus β. Hence, H has a unique fixed point satisfying Q∗ = HQ∗ and the optimal decision rule δ∗
is
δ∗(x, e) = arg max
a∈A
{
Q∗(x, a) + e(a)
}
. (24)
Furthermore, the controlled process {zt+1, xt, at} is Markovian with
pi(a|x) = ∂G[{Q
∗(x, a), a ∈ A}|x, z]
∂Q∗(x, a) . (25)
Theorem 4. If the probability measure of e is multivariate extreme-value, i.e.,
µ(de|z) = ∏
a∈A
exp{−e(a) + γ} exp[− exp{−e(a) + γ}], (26)
where γ is the Euler constant. Then, the agent will select its action a with probability
pi(a|x) = exp Q(x, a)
∑a′∈A exp Q(x, a′)
, (27)
where
Q(x, a) = r(x, a) + β∑
z′
σ(z′, x, a) log(∑
a′
exp Q(λ(x, z′, a), a′)).
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Let
V(x, e) = max
a∈A
{Q(x, a) + e(a)} . (28)
Proposition 1. Functions of Q(x, a) and V(x, e) are convex in x.
For example, under the extreme-value assumption, Q(x, a) in Theorem 4 is convex on X be-
cause f (x) = log∑i exp(xi) is a convex function (by Ho¨lder’s inequality).
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) Under the extreme-value assumption, it is clear to
see per Theorem 4 that
log
(
pi(a|x)
pi(a = 0|x)
)
= Q(x, a)−Q(x, a = 0). (29)
Thus, the IIA property still holds with respect to belief (rather than the hidden state), i.e., the
odds of choosing alternative a over the reference action 0 only depends on the attributes of the
two choices.
For data in the form of a collection of N > 0 independent finite sequences of observables
{(zt,i, at,i), 0 ≤ t ≤ T}Ni=1, a likelihood function can now be factored as
log `(θ) , log
N
∏
i=1
T−1
∏
t=0
P(zt+1,i|ζt,i, at,i)P(at,i|ζt,i)
= log
N
∏
i=1
T−1
∏
t=0
σθ2(zt+1,i, xt,i, at,i)piθ(at,i|xt,i)
=
N
∑
i=1
(
T−1
∑
t=0
log σθ2(zt+1,i, xt,i, at,i) +
T−1
∑
t=0
logpiθ(at,i|xt,i)
)
, (30)
where the second equality is by Theorem 1 that xt is a sufficient statistic for the problem. As a
result, we still can obtain a model of the agent by finding the parameter that maximizes the log
likelihood in (30).
Remark: It can be easily verified that Theorems 3-4 and Proposition 1 continue to hold for the
case in which the agent is solving a finite horizon problem. Evidently, the results in this case
require that δ, CCP, Q, V all depend on t.
4 Identification Results
A distinct feature of our model from the classical Rust’s model and its derivatives is that the
dynamics of the system under study cannot be directly observed as the system state is only
partially observable. We now show that we could identify the hidden dynamics using two
periods of data, assuming we know the cardinality of the state space of the system. To this
end, we say the dynamic can be identified by the data if it is always possible to discriminate
between two dynamics.
Theorem 5. Assume |S| is known. The hidden dynamic {P(z, a)} (not rank-1) can be uniquely iden-
tified from the first two periods of data 2.
Theorem 5 allows us to generalize the identification results in [17] and [22] for the completely
observable case to the partially observable case, by realizing that our model is a belief version
of the Rust’s model once the hidden dynamics is determined.
2The proof of Theorem 5 essentially implies that Pθ2 (z, a) can be obtained by σθ2 (z,λθ2 (zt+1, xt, at), at+1) =
P(z|ζt+1, at+1), assuming we know the belief at time t. In many applications, it is reasonable to expect that we could
find such belief points. For example, in the engine replacement example, it is acceptable to reason that the state of a
newly replace engine is good.
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Theorem 6. Assuming |S| is known. Fix the discount factor β, the distribution of random shock µ, and
reward function in the reference action, there exists only one reward structure {r(s, a) : s ∈ S, a ∈ A}
rationalizing the data.
For example, under the Gumbel assumption, it is clear to see that
V¯(x) = Ee[V(x, e)] = log
|A|−1
∑
a=0
exp (Q(x, a)−Q(x, a = 0)) + Q(x, a = 0). (31)
Note that
Q(x, a = 0) = r(x, a = 0) + βEz[V¯(λ(x, z, a))|x, a = 0] (32)
Combining Eq. (31) and Eq. (32),
Q(x, a = 0) = r(x, a = 0) + βEz[log
|A|−1
∑
a′=0
exp (Q(λ(x, z, a), a′)−Q(λ(x, z, a), a′ = 0))|x, a = 0]
+ βEz[Q(λ(x, z, a), a′ = 0))|x, a = 0],
By Eq. (29) we have
Q(x, a = 0) = r(x, a = 0) + C + βEz[Q(λ(x, z, a), a′ = 0))|x, a = 0], (33)
where
C = βEz
[
log
|A|−1
∑
a′=0
pi(a′|λ(x, z, a))
pi(a′ = 0|λ(x, z, a)) |x, a = 0
]
,
and it can be obtained from the dataset per Theorem 1 and Theorem 5. It is easy to show that
Eq. (33) is a contraction mapping; hence, there is a unique solution for Q(x, a = 0), given
r(a = 0). Thus, Q(x, a) can be identified by Eq. (29) for all a ∈ A and consequently V¯(x) as
well. Next, since
r(x, a) = Q(x, a)− βEz[V¯(λ(x, z, a))|x, a]
we can get r(x, a), and consequently, r(s, a).
If |S| is unknown, it may not be reasonable to expect the partially observable model is identi-
fiable. In practice, the number of possible states can be obtained by domain knowledge for a
particular application. For example, the possible stages of diseases or system degradation are
likely obtainable.
Corollary 1. For T < ∞, the hidden model is identifiable if µ, and both the reward structure and the
terminal value function QT in the reference action, are known.
5 Model Misspecification Errors
In this section, we examine how far the estimation may deviate from its true value if the (com-
pletely observable) Rust’s model is used to fit data generated in a partially observable setting.
We first analyze the mis-specification errors on the system dynamics, and then discuss the
potential errors on the reward structure, assuming |S| = |Z|.
In a partially observable setting, we first observe that the dynamic P(z′|z, a) estimated by
the Rust’s model is in fact a random variable, as its value depends on all past histories ζt
ending with zt = z. That is, given z′, z, a, P(z′|z, a) can be any value in {P(zt+1 = z′|zt =
z, at = a, ζ˜t−1, a˜t−1) : ∀ζ˜t−1, ∀a˜t−1 ∈ A} = {σ(z′, a,λ(z, x˜, a˜)) : x˜ ∈ X, a˜ ∈ A}. For a sample
path ζt, Proposition 2 quantifies the maximal difference between P(z′|z, a) and its counterpart
σ(z′, a, x∗) in the hidden state model, where x∗ = λ(z, a˜∗, x˜∗) is the current belief at ζt with
zt = z, and x˜∗, a˜∗ are the previous period belief xt−1 and action at−1 along the history ζt. This
difference is caused by (improperly) neglecting the information history leading to the current
stage.
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Proposition 2.
P(z′|z, a)− σ(z′, a, x∗) ≥ max
j∈S
[
λ(z, ej, a˜∗)− λ(z, x˜∗, a˜∗)
]
P(z′, a)1 ≥ 0, (34)
where ej is the unit vector in R|S| with the jth element being 1 and all other elements being 0.
We remark that the selection of j∗ ∈ arg max [λ(z, ej, a˜∗)− λ(z, x˜∗, a˜∗)]P(z′, a)1 depends on z′.
Hence, Proposition 2 also implies that
||P(·|z, a)− σ(·, a, x∗)||∞ ≥ max
z′∈Z
{
max
j∈S
[
λ(z, ej, a˜∗)− λ(z, x˜∗, a˜∗)
]
P(z′, a)1
}
, (35)
where ||v||∞ = maxz∈Z |v(z)| for any vector v ∈ R|Z|, P(·|z, a) = {P(z′|z, a)}z′∈Z, and σ(·, a, x∗) =
{σ(z′, a, x∗)}z′∈Z.
Lemma 1.
min
z
{ σ(z, a, x)
σ(z, a, x′) : σ(z, a, x
′) > 0} ≥ min
s
{ x(s)
x′(s) : x
′(s) > 0} (36)
max
z
{ σ(z, a, x)
σ(z, a, x′) : σ(z, a, x
′) > 0} ≤ max
s
{ x(s)
x′(s) : x
′(s) > 0} (37)
Define
d(x, x′) = 1−min
{
x(s)
x′(s) : x
′(s) > 0
}
,
D1(x, x′) = max{d(x, x′), d(x′, x)},
D(z, a) = max{D1(λ(z, ei, a),λ(z, ej, a)) : i, j ∈ S},
D(z, a, a′) = max{D1(λ(z, ei, a),λ(z, ej, a′)) : i, j ∈ S}. (38)
We remark that D(z, a) is a contraction coefficient (coefficient of ergodicity) for P(z, a) ([35],
[24]). The next proposition provides an upper bound on the potential difference between
P(z′|z, a) and σ(z′, x∗, a).
Proposition 3. For any a˜ ∈ A,
D1(σ(·, a,λ(z, x˜, a˜)), σ(·, a, x∗)) ≤ D(z, a˜, a˜∗), ∀x˜ ∈ X;
thus, if a˜ = a˜∗,
D1(σ(·, a,λ(z, x˜, a˜)), σ(·, a, x∗)) ≤ D(z, a˜∗), ∀x˜ ∈ X.
Proposition 3 shows that the difference is bounded above by the ergodicity of P(z, a) if a˜ = a˜∗.
If a˜ 6= a˜∗, then the discrepancy caused by the two different actions a˜ and a˜∗ will also contribute
to the upper bound.
Assume the observation probabilityQ(z′|s′, s, a) is independent of s, a and
Q(z|s) =
{
1− η, z = s,
κs,zη, z 6= s
(39)
where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, κs,z ≥ 0, κs,s = 0,∑z κs,z = 1, ∀z ∈ Z, s ∈ S.
Proposition 4. Given xt = x, at = a, st = s,
σ(z′ = i, x, a)− P(s′ = i|s, a)
= ∑˜
s
x(s˜)[P(i|s˜, a)− P(i|s, a)] + η ∑˜
s
x(s˜)[∑
s′′
κs′′ ,z=iP(s
′′|s˜, a)− P(i|s˜, a)].
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Moreover,
D1[σ(·, x, a), P(·|s, a)] = D1[P(·|s, a), (1− η) ∑˜
s
x(s˜)P(.|s˜, a) + η ∑˜
s
x(s˜)∑
s′′
κs′′ ,z=.P(s
′′|s˜, a)],
and for 0 < η < 1,
D1[σ(·, x, a), P(·|s, a)]
≤ max
{
D1
[
P(·|s, a), ∑˜
s
x(s˜)P(.|s˜, a)
]
, D1
[
P(·|s, a), ∑˜
s
∑
s′′
x(s˜)κs′′ ,z=.P(s
′′|s˜, a)
]}
.
Thus, Proposition 4 indicates that even if x = es,
σ(z′ = i, x, a)− P(s′ = i|s, a) = η∑
s′′
κs′′ ,z=i[P(s
′′|s, a)− P(i|s, a)] 6= 0.
Theorem 7. Assume a sample path ζt is given.
P(z′ = i|z, a)− P(s′ = i|s, a)
≥ max
j∈S
[
λ(z, ej, a˜∗)− λ(z, x˜∗, a˜∗)
]
P(z′, a)1+ ∑˜
s
x∗(s˜)[P(i|s˜, a)− P(i|s, a)]
+ η ∑˜
s
∑
s′′
x∗(s˜)[κs′′ ,z=iP(s′′|s˜, a)− P(i|s˜, a)].
Moreover,
D1(P(.|z, a), P(.|s, a)) ≤ max
a˜∈A
D(z, a˜, a˜∗)
+max
{
D1
[
P(·|s, a), ∑˜
s
x∗(s˜)P(.|s˜, a)
]
, D1
[
P(·|s, a), ∑˜
s
∑
s′′
x∗(s˜)κs′′ ,z=.P(s′′|s˜, a)
]}
.
Corollary 2. When η = 0, P(z′|z, a) = P(s′|s, a).
For the reward structure, the Rust’s model shows log pi(a|z)
pi(a=0|z) = Q
R(z, a) − QR(z, a = 0),
whereas in our hidden state model log pi(a|x)
pi(a=0|x) = Q(x, a) − Q(x, a = 0). Thus, we can ana-
lyze how the CCP ratios measured by the two models affect the estimated reward. Namely,
given
ρ∗(z, a) ≤ | log pi(a|z)
pi(a = 0|z) − log
pi(a|x∗)
pi(a = 0|x∗) | ≤ ρ
∗(z, a), (40)
where the difference is again caused by ignoring history ζt leading to the current observation
z, we examine how rR may deviate from the true reward structure r. As only the relative
difference between the choice-specific function Q matters, we let QR(Z, a = 0) = Q(X, a =
0) = 0.
Define
4rR = max
z,z′ ,a
|rR(z, a)− rR(z′, a)|,
||σ− PR||∗1 = maxz,a
1
2∑z′
|[σ(z′, a, x∗)− P(z′|z, a)]| = max
z,a,x˜,a˜
1
2∑z′
|[σ(z′, a, x∗)− σ(z′, a,λ(z, x˜, a˜))]|.
Theorem 8 below shows that both the deviation in the CCPs and the system dynamic will
contribute to the estimation error in the reward structure.
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Theorem 8. Given a sample path ζt,
[||r− rR||+4rR] + 2β[||σ− PR||∗1(||QR||+ log |A|) +
1
2
log |A|] ≥ (1− β)max
z,a
ρ∗(z, a).
Furthermore,
||rR − r|| ≤ (1+ β)max
z,a
ρ∗(z, a) + 2β||σ− PR||∗1 ||QR||+ βmaxz,a,x∗ |h(z, a, x∗)|,
where h : X× A× Z → R is a continuous function satisfying
(i) h(z, a, x∗)→ 0 if the observation probabilityQ → I,
(ii) maxz,a,x∗ |h(z, a, x∗)| ≤ log |A|+maxz,a,a′ |QR(z, a)−QR(z, a′)|.
6 Numerical Results
In this section, we first apply our hidden state model to the well-known engine replacement
data set for Mr. Zurcher’s decisions in [26], and then we test and validate our approach using
synthetic data sets.
6.1 Rust’s Model Revisited
To illustrate the application of the proposed methodology we revisit a subset of Rust’s dataset.
Specifically, Group 4 consisting of buses with 1975 GMC engines. As in Rust [26], we discretize
the state space in 175 bins of 2.5K miles. Evidence of positive serial correlation in mileage
increments is quite strong as the Durbin-Watson statistic is less than 1.13 for all buses except
one with a value of 1.32. The action at = 1 is associated with engine replacement at a cost RC >
0 whereas at = 0 is the continued operation. Per mile maintenance costs are parametrized by
θ1,0 (in good state) and θ1,1 (in bad state). With a belief xt ∈ [0, 1] of the engine being in good
state and zt cumulative mileage after t months, the expected (monthly) maintenance cost is of
the form (θ1,0zt)xt + (θ1,1zt)(1− xt). Monthly mileage increments ∆ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} correspond
to values between [0, 2.5K), [2.5K, 5K), [5K, 7.5K) and [7.5K, 10K), respectively. The distribution
is parametrized as follows
Pθ3( zt+1 − zt = ∆| st = 0, at = 0) = θ3,0,∆ ∆ ∈ {0, 1, 2}
Pθ3( zt+1 − zt = ∆| st = 0, at = 0) = 1− θ3,0,0 − θ3,0,1 − θ3,0,2 ∆ = 3
Similarly, we define Pθ3( zt+1 − zt = ∆| st = 1, at = 0) = θ3,1,∆,∆ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The estimation
results are described in Table 1 where the belief space (i.e. the unit interval) is discretized in a
uniform grid of 100 intervals.
Parameter θ3,0,0 θ3,0,1 θ3,0,2 θ3,1,0 θ3,1,1 θ3,1,2 θ2,0 θ2,1 θ1,0 θ1,1 RC
Good State 0.04 0.33 0.59 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.94 ∗ 0.0011 ∗ 10.11
Bad State ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.181 0.757 0.061 ∗ 0.99 ∗ 0.0011 10.11
Log-Likelihood -3818
Table 1: Parameter estimates and log-likelihood hidden state model
Compared to the original Rust’s model displayed in Table 2, the hidden state model captures
an optimal route assignment: the distribution of mileage increments for engines considered
in bad state is dominated (in the first-order stochastic sense) by the distribution of mileage
increments of engines in good state. Assigning routes with lower mileages to buses in bad
state decreases the operational cost of buses in such state. We find that the marginal operation
cost (per mile) for a bus in bad vs. good is approximately the same, namely θ1,0 ' θ1,1. This is
consistent with the optimal route assignment in the sense that if for example θ1,0 < θ1,1 then
buses in good condition would be under-utilized vis-a´-vis those in bad condition for which
replacement is not yet justified. This is an economically meaningful feature of Mr. Zucker’s
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Parameter θ3,0 θ3,1 θ3,2 θ1 RC
Rust’s Model ([26] p. 1022) 0.119 0.576 0.287 0.0012 10.89
Log-Likelihood -4496
Table 2: Parameter estimates and log-likelihood Rust’s model
behavior (ignored by Rust’s model) which improves model fit as measured by log-likelihood
in 4496−38183818 = 17.7%.
The significant increment in the log-likelihood function is achieved at the cost of 6 more pa-
rameters in dynamics and rewards. Considering that the Rust’s model is a special case of our
model, we use the log-likelihood ratio test to examine whether our model statistically outper-
forms the Rust’s model in this example. The underlying null hypothesis is H0: there is no
significant difference between the Rust’s model and our model. The log-likelihood ratio test
result in Table 3 shows that the null hypothesis is rejected with a p value very close to zero,
indicating that our model statistically outperforms the Rust’s model on the Group 4 of the 1975
GMC bus engine dataset.
Log-likelihood Degree of Freedom Statistic p Value
Hidden state model -3818 11 1356 < 10−100Rust’s model -4496 5
Table 3: The log-Likelihood ratio test for both models on the 1975 GMC engine
(Group 4) data set
6.2 Synthetic Data
We randomly generate synthetic data sets where both the system state and dynamics are hid-
den, in order to test if our approach can correctly identify the reward structure rθ1(s, a) and
the hidden dynamics Pθ2(z
′, s′|s, a), assume the discount factor β(= 0.95) is known and and
r(a = 0) is fixed. The belief space is uniformly discretized to 100 intervals over [0, 1]. Ta-
ble 4 lists the parameter values (values without parentheses) of an example in the size of
|S| = 2, |Z| = 2, and |A| = 3, where the values fitted by our model are presented in the
parentheses (r(a = 0) = [10, 3] is fixed and given during the estimation). The result shows that
our model can identify the model parameters fairly well, with maximal element-wise deviation
of 0.026 in dynamics and 0.08 in reward, using 800 sample trajectories.
a = 0 (z
′, s′)
(0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 1)
s = 0 0.72 0.08 0.02 0.18(0.724) (0.083) (0.013) (0.180)
s = 1 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.90(0.000) (0.000) (0.120) (0.880)
a = 1 (z
′, s′)
(0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 1)
s = 0 0.81 0.09 0.01 0.09(0.784) (0.100) (0.000) (0.116)
s = 1 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.90(0.002) (0.000) (0.118) (0.880)
a = 2 (z
′, s′)
(0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 1)
s = 0 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.00(0.909) (0.090) (0.000) (0.001)
s = 1 0.36 0.04 0.06 0.54(0.350) (0.043) (0.068) (0.539)
r(s, a) a
0 1 2
s = 0 10∗ 6 3
(6.08) (2.95)
s = 1 3∗ 5 7
(4.99) (6.99)
Table 4: The parameter values of a randomly generated numerical example and
the values fitted by our model (in the parentheses). The maximal element-wise
difference: 0.026 in dynamics {P(z′, s′|s, a)}, 0.08 in reward {r(s, a)}.
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a = 0 s′ = 0 s′ = 1
s = 0 0.80 0.20
(0.704) (0.296)
s = 1 0.00 1.00
(0.275) (0.725)
a = 1 s′ = 0 s′ = 1
s = 0 0.90 0.10
(0.735) (0.265)
s = 0 0.00 1.00
(0.263) (0.737)
a = 2 s′ = 0 s′ = 1
s = 0 1.00 0.00
(0.836) (0.164)
s = 1 0.40 0.60
(0.500) (0.500)
r(s, a) a
0 1 2
s = 0 10∗ 6 3
(6.64) (4.49)
s = 1 3∗ 5 7
(3.75) ( 4.94)
Table 5: Parameter values fitted by the Rust’s model. The maximal element-wise
difference: 0.275 in transition probabilities {P(s′|s, a)}, 2.06 in reward {r(s, a)}.
We also fit the same data set using the Rust’s model with result listed in Table 5. The true
transition probabilities P(s′|s, a) are obtained by P(s′|s, a) = ∑z′ P(z′, s′|s, a) and their values
are listed in the table without parentheses. The estimation result (in the parentheses) shows
that the maximal deviation (element-wise) are 0.275 and 2.06 in transition probabilities and
reward, respectively. Thus, our hidden state model performs better than the Rust’s model
in the partially observable case. Furthermore, the chi-squared statistic of the log-likelihood
ratio test is 1124.46 with degree of freedom 12, rejecting the null hypothesis of no significant
difference between the two models with a very small p value close to zero. See Table 6.
Log-likelihood Degree of Freedom Statistic p Value
Hidden state model -27642.11 22 1124.46 < 10−10Rust’s model -28204.34 10
Table 6: Log-Likelihood ratio test for our hidden model and the Rust’s model.
In addition, Fig. 2 illustrates the distributions of log-likelihood functions fitted by both models
under various randomly generated synthetic data sets. If the data is generated in a completely
observable environment, the developed hidden state model will generate the same result as
what are estimated by the Rust’s model; see Fig. 2(a)(b). However, if the data is generated in
a partially observable environment, the log-likelihood function fitted by our model ` is signif-
icantly greater than the maximal log-likelihood function produced by the Rust’s model `Rust;
see Fig. 2(c)(d). In fact, ` ≥ `Rust almost surely as the Rust’s model is a special case of our
model where the observation matrix is identity. Furthermore, the likelihood ratio test rejects
the Rust’s model with high confidence intervals and results generated by the Rust’s model can
be misleading and/or erroneous.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a dynamic discrete choice model for the case where the underlying
system state and the associated system dynamics are hidden for the decision-making agent. At
each decision epoch, the agent infers the system state from possibly noise-corrupted obser-
vations on which to base action selection. We formulated the decision making process of the
agent on the basis of partially observable Markov decision processes subject to independent
and identically distributed random shocks, generalizing the existing dynamic discrete choice
models to partially observable settings. We analyzed the structural properties of the proposed
hidden state model and proved that the model is still identifiable from sample trajectories if
the discount factor, the distribution of the random shock, the reward structure in a reference
action, and the possible number of hidden states are known. As the (completely observable)
dynamic discrete choice models are widely used in problems where the relevant state variables
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Figure 2: The log-likelihood distributions of both the Rust’s model and our model
for a thousand synthetic data sets
may only be partially observed, we analyzed the potential model misspecification errors when
the Rust’s model is used in a partially observable setting. The possible estimation discrepan-
cies were also demonstrated via numerical examples. Finally, we compared our hidden state
model to the Rust’s model on the bus engine dataset in [26]. The significant improvement in
the log-likelihood function and the log-likelihood ratio test strongly suggested that our hidden
state model outperforms the Rust’s model. Furthermore, our model also revealed economically
meaningful features of Mr. Zucker’s behavior ignored by the Rust’s model.
As this research represents a first effort on developing dynamic discrete choice models for par-
tially observable systems, future research directions are numerous. For example, our current
model assumes that the distribution of the random shock is i.i.d.. Many studies have examined
more complicated structures in completely observable dynamic choice models. Thus, extend-
ing these analyses to the partially observable case will be value-added. Also, computational
challenges of our model are obviously not trivial. Both continuous-state MDP and POMDP
suffer from the well-known curse of dimensionality, meaning that to achieve a certain level
of accuracy, the number of discretized points have to grow exponentially. Moreover, obser-
vations in many real applications can be high dimensional. Thus, another research direction
is to address computational challenges of high dimensional hidden state models. Application
wise, it will be interesting to apply this model to various relevant applications, indicatively,
building predictive models of human control when a relevant psychological trait (e.g., fatigue,
attention) is hidden.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is by induction. Assume Vt+1(ζt+1, et+1) = Vt+1(xt+1, et+1), then
Vt(ζt, et) = max
at∈A
{
∑
st
P(st|ζt)r(st, at) + et(at) + β ∑
zt+1
∫
P(zt+1|ζt, at)Vt+1(xt+1, et+1)dµ(et+1|zt+1)
}
= max
at∈A
{r(xt, at) + et(at) + β ∑
zt+1
∫
σ(zt+1, xt, at)Vt+1(λ(zt+1, xt, at), et+1)dµ(et+1|zt+1)
}
= Vt(xt, et)
where the last equality is due to the fact that both σ and λ are functions of xt.
Proof of Theorem 2. Eq. (20) is directly from the definition of G and
G[{u(xt, at), at ∈ A}|xt, zt] =
∫
∑
at∈A
[u(xt, at) + et(at)]1{Y=a}dµ(et|zt).
(i)− (iii) follow the same idea as in [27].
Proof of Theorem 3. Under the modified regularity conditions, the proof follows the exactly same
procedure as in [27] for Theorems 3.2-3.3. The controlled process {zt+1, xt, at} is Markovian be-
cause the conditional probability of at is P(at|xt), the conditional probability of xt+1 is provided
by λ(zt+1, xt, at), and the conditional probability of zt+1 is given by σ(zt+1, xt, at).
Proof of Theorem 4. The result follows by Theorem 3 and [33].
Proof of Proposition 1. The result is obvious by induction, σ ≥ 0, the maximal of convex func-
tions is still convex, and Theorem 2(i).
Proof of Theorem 5. Given two system dynamics P1(z, a), P2(z, a). Since the dataset contains
x0, a0, we can obtain σ10 (z1, x0, a0) = x0P1(z1, a0)1 and σ
2
0 (z1, x0, a0) = x0P2(z1, a0)1. Note that
σ0(z1, x0, a0) = P(z1|ζ0, a0), where P(z1|ζ0, a0) can be obtained from the first period of the data.
Thus, σ can be obtained from the data and σ10 = σ
2
0 if and only if P1(z, a)1 = P2(z, a)1. If σ
1
0 6=
σ20 , we are done. Otherwise, update belief by Eq. (14), x
1
1 = λ1(z1, x0, a0) =
x0P1(z1,a0)
σ10 (z1,x0,a0)
, x21 =
λ2(z1, x0, a0) =
x0P2(z1,a0)
σ20 (z1,x0,a0)
. Then x11 = x
2
1 if and only if P1(z, a) = P2(z, a). Now, σ
1
1 (z2, x
1
1, a1) =
x11P1(z2, a1)1 and σ
2
1 (z2, x
2
1, a1) = x
2
1P2(z2, a1)1, and σ1 is obtainable from the two period of
data as σ1(z2, x1, a1) = P(z2|ζ1, a1). Thus, σ11 = σ21 if and only if x11 = x21, indicating P1(z, a) =
P2(z, a) assuming P(z, a) is not rank-1.
Proof of Theorem 6. By Theorem 1 and Theorem 5, both CCP pi(a|xt) = P(a|ζt) and hidden
dynamics can be identified from the data. Treating belief as the state and since |ζt| < ∞,
Proposition 1 in [17] and [22] show that there is a one-to-one mapping q(X) : R|A| → R|A|, only
depending on µ, which maps the choice probability set {pi(a|x)} to the set of the difference in
action-specific value function {Q(x, a)−Q(x, a = 0)}, namely,
Q(x, a)−Q(x, a = 0) = qa({pi(a′|x)}; µ), (41)
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q0(.) = 0, and q = (q0, ..., q|A|−1). Thus, if we know Q(x, a = 0), we can recover Q(x, a), ∀a ∈ A.
Note that
Q(x, a) = r(x, a) + βEz|x,a
[
Ee|z max
a′∈A
{
Q(λ(z, x, a), a′) + e′(a′)
}]
= r(x, a) + βEz|x,a
[
Ee|z
[
max
a′∈A
{
Q(λ(z, x, a), a′)−Q(λ(z, x, a), 0) + e′(a′)}+ Q(λ(z, x, a), 0)]]
= r(x, a) + βEz|x,a
[
G
[ {
Q(λ(z, x, a), a′)−Q(λ(z, x, a), 0), a′ ∈ A} |λ(x, z, a), z]]
+ βEz|x,a [Q(λ(z, x, a), 0)] (42)
Because of the mapping q, and that the hidden dynamic {P(z, a)} is known, the quantity
βEz|x,a
[
G
[ {
Q(λ(z, x, a), a′)−Q(λ(z, x, a), 0), a′ ∈ A} |λ(x, z, a), z]]
is known. Under the assumption of r(s, 0) = 0, we have
Q(x, 0) = βEz|x,a
[
G
[ {
Q(λ(z, x, a), a′)−Q(λ(z, x, a), 0), a′ ∈ A} |λ(x, z, a), z]]
+ βEz|x,a [Q(λ(z, x, a), 0)] (43)
with only unknown Q(X, 0). It is easy to see there is a unique solution to Eq. (43) due to the
contraction mapping theorem. Consequently, all Q(X, a), a ∈ A can be recovered by Eq. (41).
Lastly,
r(x, a) = Q(x, a)
− βEz|x,a
[
G
[ {
Q(λ(z, x, a), a′)−Q(λ(z, x, a), 0), a′ ∈ A} |λ(x, z, a), z]−Q(λ(z, x, a), 0)].
As r(x, a) = xr(a), {r(s, a) : s ∈ S, a ∈ A} can be uniquely determined.
Proof of Corollary 1. When QT(X, 0) and r(a = 0) are known, we can obtain Qt(X, 0) via
Qt(x, 0) = r(x, a = 0) + Ez
[
G
[ {
Q(λ(z, x, a), a′)−Q(λ(z, x, a), 0), a′ ∈ A} |λ(x, z, a), z]]
+ Ez [Qt+1(λ(z, x, a), 0)] . (44)
The rest follows exactly as in the proof of Theorem 6.
Proof of Proposition 2.
P(z′|z, a)− σ(z′, a, x∗) = max
x˜∈X,a˜∈A
σ(z′,λ(z, x˜, a˜), a)− σ(z′,λ(z, x˜∗, a˜∗), a)
≥ max
j∈S
[
λ(z, ej, a˜∗)− λ(z, x˜∗, a˜∗)
]
P(z′, a)1.
Assume by contradiction that
max
j∈S
[
λ(z, ej, a˜∗)− λ(z, x˜∗, a˜∗)
]
P(z′, a)1 < 0.
Then
λ(z, ej, a˜∗)P(z′, a)1 < λ(z, x˜∗, a˜∗)P(z′, a)1, ∀j ∈ S,
which is
ejP(z, a˜∗)P(z′, a)1
ejP(z, a˜∗)1
<
x˜∗P(z, a˜∗)P(z′, a)1
x˜∗P(z, a˜∗)1
, ∀j ∈ S.
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Note that x˜∗ = ∑j x˜∗,jej, thus
x˜∗P(z, a˜∗)P(z′, a)1
x˜∗P(z, a˜∗)1
=
∑j x˜∗,jejP(z, a˜∗)P(z′, a)1
∑j x˜∗,jejP(z, a˜∗)1
Recall that if a, b, c, d > 0, then a/b ≥ c/d⇔ a/b ≥ (a + c)/(b + d). Thus, we have
∑j x˜∗,jejP(z, a˜∗)P(z′, a)1
∑j x˜∗,jejP(z, a˜∗)1
≤ max
j∈S
ejP(z, a˜∗)P(z′, a)1
ejP(z, a˜∗)1
,
a contradiction. Hence, maxj∈S
[
λ(z, ej, a˜∗)− λ(z, x˜∗, a˜∗)
]
P(z′, a)1 ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.
σ(z, x, a)
σ(z, x′, a) =∑s
∑s′ P(z, s′|s, a)x(s)
σ(z, x′, a) =∑s
∑s′ P(z, s′|s, a)x′(s)
σ(z, x′, a)
x(s)
x′(s)
Note that f (s) = ∑s′ P(z,s
′ |s,a)x′(s)
σ(z,x′ ,a) ≥ 0 and ∑s f (s) = ∑s
∑s′ P(z,s′ |s,a)x′(s)
σ(z,x′ ,a) =
σ(z,x′ ,a)
σ(z,x′ ,a) = 1. Thus,
σ(z, x, a)
σ(z, x′, a) ≥ mins
x(s)
x′(s) , ∀z
leading to inequality (36). The proof for inequality (37) is similar.
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that
D1(σ(·, a,λ(z, x˜, a˜)), σ(·, a, x∗))
= D1(σ(·, a,λ(z, x˜, a˜)), σ(·, a,λ(z, x˜∗, a˜∗)))
≤ D1(λ(z, x˜, a˜),λ(z, x˜∗, a˜∗))
≤ D(z, a˜, a˜∗)
where the second to the last inequality is by Lemma 1, and the last inequality is from the fact
that
D1(x, ρx′ + (1− ρ)x′′) ≤ max{D1(x, x′), D1(x, x′′)}, x, x′, x′′ ∈ X, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, (A.3 in [24])
and λ(z, x, a) = ∑i
xi [ei P(z,a)1]
[xP(z,a)1] λ(z, ei, a) (A.4 in [24]).
Proof of Proposition 4. For the first part,
σ(z′ = i, x, a)− P(s′ = i|s, a)
= ∑˜
s
∑
s′′
P(z′ = i|s′′)P(s′′|s˜, a)x(s˜)− P(i|s, a)
= ∑˜
s
[P(i|s˜, a)− P(i|s, a)]x(s˜) + η ∑˜
s
(∑
s′′
κs′′ ,z=iP(s
′′|s˜, a)− P(i|s˜, a))x(s˜),
by the definition ofQ. For the second part, note that σ(z′ = i, x, a) can also be written as
σ(z′ = i, x, a) = (1− η) ∑˜
s
P(i|s˜, a)x(s˜) + η ∑˜
s
∑
s′′
κs′′ ,z=iP(s
′′|s˜, a)x(s˜).
Let pi1(i) = ∑s˜ P(i|s˜, a)x(s˜) and pi2(i) = ∑s˜ ∑s′′ κs′′ ,z=iP(s′′|s˜, a)x(s˜), then pi1,pi2 ∈ X. The
result follows from (A.3) in [24].
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Proof of Theorem 7. Note that P(z′ = i|z, a)− P(s′ = i|s, a) = P(z′ = i|z, a)−σ(z′ = i, a,λ(z, x˜∗, a˜∗))+
σ(z′ = i, a,λ(z, x˜∗, a˜∗))− P(s′ = i|s, a). The results follow by Proposition 2 and Proposition 4.
In addition, since D1 is a metric on X, we have
D1(σ(·, a,λ(z, x˜, a˜)), P(.|s, a)) ≤ D1[σ(·, a,λ(z, x˜, a˜)), σ(·, x∗, a)] + D1[σ(·, x∗, a), P(·|s, a)].
Hence, Propositions 3 - 4 lead to the result.
Proof of Corollary 2. If η = 0, then x = es, D1[σ(·, a,λ(z, x˜, a˜)), σ(·, x∗, a)] = 0, and D1[σ(·, x∗, a), P(·|s, a)] =
0. Hence, D1[σ(·, a,λ(z, x˜, a˜)), P(.|s, a)] = 0, implying the result.
Proof of Theorem 8.
ρ∗(z, a) ≤ |Q(x∗, a)−QR(z, a)|
≤ |r(x∗, a)− rR(z, a)|
+ β|∑
z′
σ(z′, a, x∗) log(∑
a′
exp (Q(λ(z′, x∗, a), a′))−∑
z′
P(z′|z, a) log(∑
a′
exp (QR(z′, a′)))|
≤ |x∗r(a)− x∗rR(a) + x∗rR(a)− rR(z, a)|
+ β|∑
z′
σ(z′, a, x∗)[log(∑
a′
exp (Q(λ(z′, x∗, a), a′))− log(∑
a′
exp (QR(z′, a′)))]|
+ β|∑
z′
[σ(z′, a, x∗)− P(z′|z, a)] log(∑
a′
exp (QR(z′, a′)))|
≤ ||r− rR||+4rR
+ βmax
z′ ,a′
(|Q(λ(z′, x∗, a), a′))−QR(z′, a′)|) + β log |A|+ 2β||σ− PR||∗1(||QR||+ log |A|)
≤ [||r− rR||+4rR](1+ β)
+ β2 max
z′ ,a′
max
z′′ ,a′′
(|Q(λ(z′′, a′,λ(z′, a, x∗)), a′′))−QR(z′′, a′′)|) + (β+ β2) log |A|
+ 2(β+ β2)||σ− PR||∗1(||QR||+ log|A|)
≤ [||r− rR||+4rR] 1
1− β +
β
1− β log |A|+ 2
β
1− β ||σ− P
R||∗1(||QR||+ log |A|),
where the fourth inequality is by maxi{xi} ≤ log∑Ni=1 exp (xi) ≤ maxi{xi}+ log |N|, the fifth
inequality is by induction, and the last inequality is because Q ∈ B is bounded. The result
follows by rearranging the terms.
On the other hand,
|rR(z, a)− r(x∗, a)|
≤ |Q(x∗, a)−QR(z, a)|
+ β|∑
z′
σ(z′, a, x∗) log(∑
a′
exp (Q(λ(z′, x∗, a), a′))−∑
z′
P(z′|z, a) log(∑
a′
exp (QR(z′, a′)))|
Let a∗(x) ∈ arg maxa∈A Q(x, a), and a∗R(z) ∈ arg maxa∈A QR(z, a). Then, we have
|rR(z, a)− r(x∗, a)|
≤ ρ∗(z, a)
+ β|∑
z′
σ(z′, a, x∗)Q(λ(z′, x∗, a), a∗[λ(z′, x∗, a)])−∑
z′
P(z′|z, a)QR(z′, a∗[λ(z′, x∗, a)])|
+ β|∑
z′
σ(z′, a, x∗) log(∑
a′
exp (Q(λ(z′, x∗, a), a′)−Q(λ(z′, x∗, a), a∗[λ(z′, x∗, a)]))
−∑
z′
P(z′|z, a) log(∑
a′
exp (QR(z′, a′)−QR(z′, a∗[λ(z′, x∗, a)])))|,
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since log∑Ni=1 exp (xi) = a + log∑
N
i=1 exp (xi − a), ∀a ∈ R. Now let
h(z, a, x∗) =∑
z′
σ(z′, a, x∗) log(∑
a′
exp (Q(λ(z′, x∗, a), a′)−Q(λ(z′, x∗, a), a∗[λ(z′, x∗, a)]))
−∑
z′
P(z′|z, a) log(∑
a′
exp (QR(z′, a′)−QR(z′, a∗[λ(z′, x∗, a)])))
Then,
|rR(z, a)− r(x∗, a)|
≤ ρ∗(z, a)
+ β|∑
z′
σ(z′, a, x∗)Q(λ(z′, x∗, a), a∗[λ(z′, x∗, a)])−∑
z′
σ(z′, a, x∗)QR(z′, a∗[λ(z′, x∗, a)])|
+ β|∑
z′
σ(z′, a, x∗)QR(z′, a∗[λ(z′, x∗, a)])−∑
z′
P(z′|z, a)QR(z′, a∗[λ(z′, x∗, a)])|+ β|h(z, a, x∗)|
≤ (1+ β)max
z,a
ρ∗(z, a) + 2β||σ− PR||∗1 ||QR||+ β|h(z, a, x∗)|.
Taking the maximum on both sides gives
max
z,a,x∗
|rR(z, a)− r(x∗, a)| ≤ (1+ β)maxz,a ρ
∗(z, a) + 2β||σ− PR||∗1 ||QR||+ βmaxz,a,x∗ |h(z, a, x∗)|,
indicating the result. Lastly, it is easy to see that h(z, a, x∗)→ 0 as Q→ I, where I is the identity
matrix. Furthermore,
h(z, a, x∗) ≤ log |A| −∑
z′
P(z′|z, a)[QR(z′, a∗R(z′))−QR(z′, a∗[λ(z′, x∗, a)])]
≤ log |A|+max
z,a,a′
|QR(z, a)−QR(z, a′)|,
and
h(z, a, x∗) ≥ − log |A| −∑
z′
P(z′|z, a)[QR(z′, a∗R(z′))−QR(z′, a∗[λ(z′, x∗, a)])]
≥ − log |A| −max
z,a,a′
|QR(z, a)−QR(z, a′)|.
Hence, the result follows.
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